



Is Memory the Criterium of Personal Identity on David Hume's Conceptions?

Dr. Nargish Afroza

Researcher, Department of Philosophy, University of Beira Interior, Portugal

Abstract- In this paper, it will try to clarify why David Hume did not refer to memory as the only source in providing a theory of personal identity whereas the eminent 17th century philosopher John Locke called that in his illustrious work "An Essay concerning Human understanding", the memory is the only source of personal identity. Hume, in his prosperous work "A Treatise of Human Nature" (THN/T), stated that the necessary relations are only source of personal identity because in this case causality and analogy must be recognized as the fundamental principles. Because the individual can imagine his/her personal identity based on fundamental principles. Therefore, according to Hume, the identity of person is nothing more than the imagination of fiction. However, we will analyse here, how Hume can refute John Locke's theory of personal identity by the beliefs of necessary relations.

Keywords- David Hume; John Locke; Personal Identity; Memory; Necessary Relations.

I. INTRODUCTION

It will be show in this paper that Hume in his work "A Treatise of Human Nature" (Hume, 1739) in explaining the theory of personal identity did not only declare memory as the only cause, but he also specifically declared necessary relations. He shows how our mind imagines personal identity influenced by these essential relationships. He contradicts John Locke's identity theory, and he clarifies that a theory of personal identity based on "consciousness" alone cannot be described. For if "consciousness" alone is to be described as the identity of the soul, then the person cannot be called numerically one at the derivation of time. Because we cannot remember all events in our memory, if Locke's statement is accepted, then personal identity cannot be described.

Hume therefore admits causal relations in his theory of explanation so that we have to base ourselves only on events that have happened in the past. Hume thinks that we can make present judgments based on causal relations even if we forget past events and infer the perception of the succession of things through relations of analogy — thus we maintained the identity of an object or person. In explaining this process, Hume clarifies that memory plays only an auxiliary role in defining personal identity, so memory is not essential. But causation and analogy serve as fundamental principles in personal identity. Because the causality and analogy are the relations of our mental process to belief our personal identity. That's why, Hume seems to think that personal identity creates only the fictional necessary relations. However, now we turn to discuss this matter arguably in the next.

Hume's arguments on personal identity in contrast of Locke's term of "memory"

Now we have to analyze whether the memory creates personal identity. Hume gives his account of memory very early in "A Treatise of Human Nature" (Hume, 1739). He writes:

"We find by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance there as an idea; and this it may do after two different ways: either when in its new



appearance it retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity and is somewhat intermediate betwixt an impression and an idea; or when it entirely loses that vivacity and is a perfect idea. The faculty by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner, is called the MEMORY, and the other the IMAGINATION.” (Hume, 1739, T1.1.3.1/p.8)

According to Hume, when we experience an object, an impression is made in our mind about that object which later appears as an idea. Hence, we have two different conditions: if the intermediate state of an impression and idea retains enough of its first “vividness” in its new form, then our impression is repeated by the processes known as memory and imagination.

And if, on the other hand, the impression completely loses its “vivacity”, i.e., the impression does not recur, it remains the same; it is a perfect idea without any change.

However, for Hume’s conceptions about self does not accept identity or sameness at overtime. When we find those perceptions that are already in our collected memories. But that collected memory and the object of real representation is never the same, it changes at every moment. Whenever we try to know something directly, we can know nothing but the experience we have gathered through imagination and memory. But we do not find any perception that will allow us to the concept of the soul. (see (Smith, 1941))¹

But on the other hand, we cannot collect past perceptions anywhere because perceptions are never permanent, they are transitory, so how can past experiences be recalled in our mind? Moreover, how are we for them? How do we feel the similarity or familiarity of present perceptions with past perceptions? Another question is what are the signs of the past perception by which we can recognize the present perception? That is, how to explain the correct relationship between different perceptions - Hume calls this problem in his theory a problem of paramount importance in his conclusion where he finds it difficult to explain the theory of causation. He states, “[t]herefore, memory does not so much produce as discover personal identity, by shewing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions. Twill be incumbent on those, who affirm that memory produces entirely our personal identity, to give a reason why we can thus extend our identity beyond our memory.” (Hume, 1739, T1.4.6.20/p.262)

The question here is how much we are able to be present in the same perception? According to Hume (Hume, 1739), ideas can be connected by necessary relations, so all our impressions are closely related with the relation of resemblance. Again, situations may occur where similar impressions occur in succession. Perceptions may appear to be, old perceptions are devoted to new perceptions by the necessary relations of causality, resemblance, and contiguity—then the earlier perceptions will be recognized in us as some memory which will become available to 1 Kemp Smith (1941) claims in his great work

“The Philosophy of David Hume” that Hume does not disapprove that the existence of a continuing soul. Hume admits that human natures are always changing and temporary in describing human nature because, according to him, the soul is a collection of bundles. In this context Kemp Smith states that human nature is nothing more than the self because it is the determining centre of all our knowledge, perceptions, feelings and emotions. Since we cannot imagine or infer an entity that is permanent and unchanging, we have no contention to believe that this racial soul exists, nor can we infer from any reason that the soul exists.

us by the reverse process. But even in this case some problems may arise even though all perceptions are related in necessary relation. In this case, according to Hume, the question that appears is, by what relation do we describe the continuous persistence of a thinking person in the invariableness of our mind? In this case, Hume says, “here ‘tis evident we must confine ourselves to resemblance and



causation, and must drop contiguity, which has little or no influence in the present case." (Hume, 1739, T1.4.6.17/p.260)

However, memory not only invents events and past events that we had but also the perceptions of the imagination. Here to think that the concept of imagination is very much related to the real world because from real concepts we have illusions or dreams. Yet it should not be said that imagination represents our real world, and it should be said that the perceptions of imagination make a correspondence between a real object and an unreal object within our mental world. But it can never be presented as factual or absolute truth. Moreover, it would be more appropriate to say that all these imaginary perceptions have occurred through our various mental processes. It would never be appropriate to say that only real events can be preserved in our memory, so to say that various fictional events also remain in our minds. In this response, this comment is quite acceptable,

"When I speak of perceptions of imagination here, I am referring to perceptions which do not represent any „real“, external occurrences, but are only "imagined" as dreams, hallucinations, inventions etc. are. As I just said, we are able to remember not only perceptions of facts but also perceptions of imagination. It is, as anyone knows, possible to remember dreams, hallucinations and so on."(Langer, 1997, P.11)

John Locke's theory is notable in the context of explaining the theory of memory because he analysed his theory of personal identity based on memory. It is true that Hume owes much of his analysis of "personal identity" to Locke, although, he nowhere explicitly mentions it. When Hume starts the analysis of the identity, he examines the perfect identity and imperfect identity, Locke explained this identity earlier in his book "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding". Where he explains the identity of "vegetables" (Locke, 1690, E2.27.4/p.314) and the identity of "animals" (Locke, 1690, E2.27.5/p.314) as examples. Locke's two "identities" are 1. One identity that is never changeable at the variation of the time such as the mass of matter. 2. Another type of identity is a gradually changed at over time such as living body and plants (Locke, 1975, E2.27.3/p.313). The recent scholar Kaufman (Kaufman, 2016) states in this context,

"Locke's attack on substance-based theories of identity focuses mainly on theories of personal identity in which sameness of a thinking substance is necessary and sufficient

for personal identity. Locke's view of the identity of organisms, however, already rejects the notion that sameness of corporeal substance is either necessary or sufficient for the sameness of the organism. Because Locke holds that organisms persist and yet it is undeniable that the mass of matter that constitutes the organism at a time does not persist, Locke must look elsewhere to account for the organism's persistence." (Kaufman, 2016, P.239-40)

However, Hume did not corroborate to Locke's concept of "identity" because he only explained his embodiment of the soul based on the hypothetical theory where Locke believed that our various experiences accumulated by memory explain our identity, i.e., he explained memory as consciousness. Hume declares this type of theory to be anomalous about the identity of the individual. He states,

"Who can tell me, for instance, what were his thoughts and actions on the first of January 1715, the 11th of March 1719, and the 3d of August 1733? Or will he affirm, because he has entirely forgot the incidents of these days, that the present self is not the same person with the self of that time; and by that means overturn all the most establish'd notions of personal identity?"(Hume, 1739, T1.4.7.20/p.262)

But John Locke believed that a person could achieve his identity as long as he can keep his conscious mind awake. But according to Hume, memory not only keeps the consciousness of the individual awake but also helps us to recognise objects according to resemblance or causal principles of various causes.



This perception creates the mental associations that lead us to believe in the soul as a permanent entity. Thus, we mistakenly think that identity depends on various relationships. Hume states in our error –

“But having once acquired this notion of causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our persons beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed.” (Hume, 1739, T1.4.6.20/p.262)

We believe that action and cause are extended by the same chain that ensures our identity where no memory is needed. For there are many events which we have completely forgotten but which we can ascertain by their effect on the causal process. As such, some unexpectedly forgotten experience is considered a part of the self because it appears to be an experienced experience. In that regard, he said,

“a system of different perceptions or different existences, which are link’d together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other.” (Hume, 1739, T 1.4.6.19/p.261)

Although, we mistakenly think, distinct impressions are connected simultaneously by the necessary causal connections and create a continuing self. He mentions in this context a number of causal relationships in each perception. So, Hume continued,

“Our impressions to give rise to their correspondent ideas in their turn produce other impressions. One thought chase another and draws after it a third, by which it is expell’d in its turn” (Hume, 1739, T1, 4.6.19/p.261)

He states about the relation of causation to indicate to say Locke,

“Our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distinct perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains and pleasures”. (Hume, 1739, T1.4.6.19/p.261)

Along with memories, our mental states define personal identity by connecting various causal connections. For Hume makes clear that without memory we can clearly ascertain present conclusions and future interpretations by causal connections. Because some of our conscious thoughts and past actions are not produced by memory alone.

According to Hume, while memory is the only continuation of the succession of perception. This is the difference between Hume and Locke. Because Locke presents his theory of person’s existence emerged on memory only, then it can be said,

“For Locke the self is identical with consciousness and consciousness is accessible empirically. As far as the identity of human is concerned, identity of the self depends on the consciousness of the person. The person is identical to himself to the extent that he is aware of his own perceptions and thinking. The range of the person’s memory sets the limits of consciousness.” (Azeri, 2011, p.222)

But Hume states about that,

“[...] the memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions.” (Hume, 1739, T1.4.6.18/p.261)

For Locke, it is only memory that maintains the continuity of succession of perception. So, if we do not have memory, then we will have no causal system, no action, and no continuity of causes, which will form our identity. But according to Hume, if we get the idea of connection from memory to action, we



can extend our experiences by a chain of causality. Then even if we forget past events from memory, we can still maintain our existence or identity. Hume states,

"As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be consider'd, upon that account chiefly, as the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we never shou'd have any notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, which constitute our self or person. But having once acquired this notion of causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our persons beyond our memory, and can comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely forgot, but suppose in general to have existed." (Hume, 1739, T1.4.6.20/pp.261-62)

While Locke tried to explain our "identity" entirely based on memory alone, Hume rejected such a view and established the concept of causality. But if we simply accept Locke's idea of this, then we cannot explain self-identity outside of memory. But if we acknowledge Hume's hypothesis, we explain the identity of objects by assuming a causal connection between perceptions, but this assumption is nothing more than imaginary concept (Hume, 1739, T1.4.6.14/p.258).

Locke says that "it is [consciousness] which makes everyone to be what he calls self and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things: in this alone consists personal entity, i.e., the sameness of a rational being. And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person...." (Locke, 1975, E2.27.9/p.319). But according to this definition, the identity of the person in this case faces special problems because a person cannot depend entirely on consciousness to maintain his identity. So, in this case late 17th and middle of 18th century philosopher Bishop Joseph Butler's argument seems quite reasonable. He states,

"But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say, that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say, that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what he can remember; indeed, none but what he reflects upon. And one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity; any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes." (Butler, 1875, p.358)

Butler clarifies the confusion about Locke's "identity" in his analysis, when Locke says of "identity", "The question being what makes the same person; and not whether it be the same identical substance, which always thinks in the same person, which, in this case, matters not at all: different substances, by the same consciousness (where they do partake in it) being united into one person, as well as different bodies by the same life

are united into one animal, whose identity is preserved in that change of substances by the unity of one continued life." (Locke, 1975, E2.27.10/pp.319-20).

Then Butler explained, Locke in the "identity" analysis, identifies "personal identity" with "consciousness" as a person can last up to a certain awareness in the flow of time. But it needs to be clarified that no matter how permanent the awareness is, each time we perceive new things that are available to our consciousness and the new thing is completely different. However, Butler says that the process of "identity" will not succeed if we think of the existing thing as separate, so he makes it clear that it must always be accepted,

"Upon comparing the consciousness of one's self, or one's own existence, in any two moments, there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of personal identity. And as the two former comparisons not only give us the ideas of similitude and equality; but also show us, that two triangles are alike, and twice



two and four are equal: so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal identity, but also shows us the identity of ourselves in those two moments; the present, suppose, and that immediately past; or the present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past. Or in other words, by reflecting upon that which is myself now, and that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern they are not two, but one and the same self." (Butler, 1875, P.358)

Herein lies Hume's difference with Butler. Hume never admitted the persons existence because he considered such identification is false. He accepts the successions of different perceptions in the variation of time. For if Locke's and Butler's theory of "identity" were accepted, to do so would be to treat a person as having "self-impressions" – which is clearly false according to Hume. So, he says, "self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suppos'd to have a reference" (Hume, 1739, T1.4.6.2/p.251). This means that we must have an impression of ourselves, but it is not really an impression. If "self" and "self-impression" are admitted, it would be contradictory, as Butler distinguishes between the "acts of consciousness" that make up "consciousness", i.e., thus consciousness makes "self-impressions" because the object of consciousness is the self. Hume contradicted all these statements. In that case 18th century philosopher Thomas Reid states to critique of Locke's consciousness of personal identity theory,

"Our consciousness, our memory, and every operation of the mind are still flowing like the water of a river, or like time itself. The consciousness I have this moment can no more be the same consciousness I had last moment, than this moment can be the last moment. Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence."(Reid, 1785, P.251)

Hume says memory is simply our recollection of past events that answers the question of recognition but does not constitute personal identity. It is the increasing similarity between our mental events. Because it is on the basis of such similar events that we recognize a person we have seen long ago, that is, memory creates a series of events from our past that answers some questions about the person in the present. But since Memory belongs to a standard viewpoint of recognition, it is not possible for us to memorize all series of memories states in this context, "For without memory, how could anyone discover that a series of mental items really

were related by resemblance and causation, which, according to the theory, are the two basic relations? How could he even discover the existence of the mental items? But this does not make the memory relation into a third basic relation. It is true that he allows it a minor role in producing personal identity, as opposed to discovering it. Because he thinks that memory impressions are replicas, the memory relation multiplies resemblances and so helps to produce personal identity as a sort of side effect. But this work is done through resemblance, and resemblance is a basic relation already on the list, and so the memory relation does not require a title to a place of its own on the list...It might be argued that Hume was right to refuse to put the memory relation on the list of relations that constitute personal identity. Perhaps memory does only discover personal identity." (Pears, 1975, P.18)

If Hume had linked memory to the causal relation of psychological events, then similarity between individual perceptions would have been much more important. In this case, then, memory highlights an important role in the formation of personal identity. But he did not declare memory as the only focal point of identity, he called memory as a side principle of identity. He did not declare memory to be the fundamental principle of identity such as principle of causality and resemblance. So, memory will only express its contribution to identity through necessary relations, but Hume does not explicitly state that memory's legitimacy to identity.

Hume provides a general outline of how memory is related to causality is shown in the following:

1. Memory makes similarity between successive perceptions.



2. Memory makes a possible connection between the concept of past and present.
3. Memory makes a continued process of the identity of a person.
4. Memory makes belief about personal identity through necessary connections.
5. The belief in necessary connections to makes personal identity.

He holds that our memory is capable of tracing the effects of our beliefs through a necessary connection with the imagination. We believe that the constant relationship between a cause and an action is actually a necessary connection. Thus, we believe this connection from a constant connection. In this case, Hume tries to make clear, we mistake a necessary connection from a continuous connection. We can no longer deny the world of necessary connections on the basis of assumptions. But to refute the belief in this necessary connection, we must submit to a rational imagination which would contradict the belief in inferring "cause" from "effect", that is, that we would not infer "effect" from "cause". Any similarity between concepts can be noticed unless they are shared by the same. For example, without the concept of a "red vase", I can notice the difference between the "red vase" in front of my eyes now and the "red vase" I saw two days ago. I remember the impression of the "red vase" I saw two days ago, that is, the impression of the "vase" is copied in my mind to be reunited with the "red vase" seen today.

In this case, we can reasonably imagine that two days ago impression of "red vase" is no different from today's "red vase", so the belief in perceptual similarity must be rejected. My perception of two days ago "red vase" cannot affect my perception of today except in my mind. In this respect, Hume teaches us not to describe personal identity in terms of necessary connections, and not to influence present perceptions by relating them to the past. Thus, if we believe in necessary connections based on continuous connections, distant perceptions will influence each other and make predictions about the behaviour of objects that are always claimed to be always stable, which are untenable.

However, our continuous connected experiences are within our accumulated memories, this (continuous connected experiences) is not possible without memory. Our memory presupposes that I am a single soul, so today's "I" and yesterday's "I" are one. But it will not give rise to any belief in necessary connections without a memory of clear continuous connections. Hume argues that beliefs about causal relationships come from our exclusive imagination. These false beliefs would therefore not be able to be revealed unless Hume applied a method of causal explanation that identified the effect of the belief as its cause.

This approach presupposes that the individual as the identity of a distinct individual who constructs the concept of a single self in the amalgamation of various experiences. But the relations which presuppose the individual to a single soul are connected in the necessary connection. But these necessary connections of the individual must be "imaginary" and felt as opposed to the reality that the different perceptions of the mind influence and cause each other. These imaginary relationships explain the individual's sense of unity, and they are produced in the individual's experience as a regular process that constantly concerns the past and the present. Imaginary relations therefore make the individual continuously unitary, and the perceptions affect each other through causality.

However, now proceed to analyse whether there is any ultimate existential self, according to Hume.

Self-Existence should be a more Conventional/Provisional Level of Truth than the Ultimate/Extreme Level of Truth

Hume thinks that the concept of the perception of the self is what we gain from our experience, as Locke points out. Because we cannot think of anything outside of our experience that we can analyse. Hence, Hume always called the person as a social being that possessing various experiences. The reason for stating this is that the Buddhists argument that the person is a transcendental entity because the person is something that cannot acquire some identity apart from mundane experience and physical processes that ultimately exist. Similarly, although Hume have not precisely spoken of conventional



persistence, as James Giles (Giles, 1993) asserts that Hume claims the conventional truth of the persistence of the self because the self does not ultimately exist. Similarly, Locke referred to our actual memory-related perceptions as "identity". But on the other hand, James Giles (Giles, 1993, P.188) claimed, Descartes claimed the existence of the soul as an extreme truth rather than a provisional truth. In this context, it is necessary to bring up the context of Brahminism where they claim that the self is ageless and unchanging to clarify the persistence of the self/soul/ātman.

Now to discuss Locke's identification of the person with regard to practical experience, which Hume partially supports but rejects ultimately. It is clear that Hume follows the order of Locke's theory of personal identity, that's why there is some resemblance between his position and that of Locke's. It is also clear that Hume did not encounter the same problem as Locke in the theory of identity he invented². However, as Ruth Boeker states in that context,

"Hume's theory of personal identity is developed in response to Locke's account of personal identity." (Boeker, 2015, abstract pg.)

On the one side, as Brahmanism admits the persistence of an individual's "self", on the other side, like Hume, Locke rejects the persistence of a person's "self". Locke does not consider such an individual soul to exist in the person. According to Locke, the key to understanding the soul is the mind, concern consciousness, and memory of previous experiences. Where personal identity is evident is when I am concerned about myself and carry a definite concept of myself such as willingness, feeling and thinking – these things acquire the concept of soul, then, I am concerned that I persist. In analysing the concept of soul, it is noted that I can only remember memories of times when I was concern of some earlier event.

But in other situations when I am not concerned about that thing, we do not remember it easily because there is no thought, no desire, or no feeling about it. Again, there are many situations that are easily remembered, such as I ate at a restaurant yesterday – in which case not much concern ness is required. Again, we have many experiences which we completely forget and suddenly remember, but in the unconsciousness of such events we admit of much confusion when we cannot remember whether it is the same person, the same substance, or the same spirit. If we are aware of our past experiences, then personal identity is never in doubt. Then from this analysis, we can understand that Locke always means consciousness by the soul, but there has no role of the material entity about consciousness.

In relation to this interpretation, Hume counters this argument with Locke's ironic example in which consciousness specifies the concept of the same soul and not something else (not matter or body). That is "[U]pon separation of this little finger, should this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the person, the same person; and self then would have nothing to do with the rest of the body." (Locke, 1690, E2.27.17/p.325). It appears that a person has the consciousness in his little finger, in which case, if that person's little finger is separated from his body, all consciousness will flow into that finger, then this finger and that person will belong to the same sensibility, they will be treated as the same person. However, the two objects are separate and do not share the same consciousness, so they cannot be upheld as the same person. But according to Hume, we cannot have perceptual idea about ourselves at all, only the "mistake perceptual idea" (my italics) of ourselves based on conceptual imaginations. On the other hand, according to Locke, we can only perceptually identify what is our soul through the concern consciousness (my italics).

It's unambiguous that "Hume's theory of personal identity is developed in response to Locke's account of personal identity" (added italics) (Boeker, 2015, p.105). Locke believes that personal identity is formed by the individual's consciousness (see (Afroza, 2023)), but he interprets the terms "person", "man", and "substance" (Locke, 1975, E2.27.26/p.331) as distinctly comparative, as he claims that "person" is a "forensic term" (Locke, 1975, E2.27.26/p.331). Although Hume did not emphasize Locke's distinction



between these terms. But while Hume acknowledges Locke's consciousness of different perceptions of the person's identity with respect to memory, Hume claims to explain identity beyond memory in terms of causal mechanisms. In this respect, Hume's identity theory seems more tenable than Locke's. Hume rejects Locke's representations of personal identity-due to the "Consciousness alone unites actions into the same person." (Locke, 1975, E2.27.16/p.324). Locke's discussion of

soul identification is very important to trace to Descartes because Locke accepted the argument of the cogito, so he admits the metaphysical self, but then treats personal identity as a matter of ethical and social life unified by memory. There is definitely an ethical-social turn in Locke as far as the self is "concerned", and Hume follows him in this aspect but goes further because he rejects intellectual intuition, which is at the heart of the cogito argument, and is a more thorough and radical empiricist than Locke. Descartes's cogito argument claims that one thing that is absolutely certain and cannot be doubted is its own existence as a matter of conscious thought. In this context, I radically do not believe all objects of knowledge without our own existence, only believe when I seems to think of my own perception, and it is not impossible to know when I am examining my consciousness for existence. But Hume does not appear the persistence of soul in anyway, everything that does not seem to exist to us lasts for a while and is our delusion.

So, whenever we think about our existence, it is an effect of all our awareness. In Hume's statement "when I enter I call myself; I always stumble" (added italics) (Hume, 1739, T1.4.6.3/p.252) – James Gilles comments on Hume's use of the word "I" in this context,

"[t]he word "I" is being used at the conventional level: it is merely a generally understood term whose proper use is determined by mutual agreement. We should not, therefore, think that in using the first-person pronoun Hume has committed himself to the existence of a self at the ultimate level". (Giles, 1993, P.188)

Here it is clear that what we want to explain the identity of things in general is in fact conventionally true, just as Locke wants to explain the concept of the soul as what we perceive in ordinary life to describe the identity of the individual. Hume likewise analyses the concept of soul in ordinary life by analysing various available memories and beliefs in causal chains. But we cannot explain any perception that is outside of our ordinary living. But in this case, many may question that dreams or imagination or illusion – these are not true, then how can we explain them? In that case, illusions or dreams or imaginations are all effects of real experience, so they should be called part of experience. Thus, Hume's theory of the identity of the soul is only conventionally true but ultimately false or null. On the other hand, Descartes in his great theory that "I think, therefore I am," – in this case, James Giles (Giles, 1993) claims that he sought to establish ultimate truth over conventional truth,

"I must exist, reasoned Descartes, because even when I doubt that I exist there is still an I that is doing the doubting. But Descartes has become led astray by his own language, for there is no need for the "I" in "I think" or "I doubt" to refer to anything. What Descartes was aware of, as both Hume and the Buddha would agree, was just

thinking, not an I that was doing the thinking. Consequently Descartes might just as well have said (and should have said if his concern was with ultimate rather than conventional truth) "there is thinking, therefore there are thoughts." And such a deduction, if we may call it that, does not suffice to prove the existence of an I" (Giles, 1993, p. 188).

However, we should proceed for the conclusion in that whole analysis of this paper.



CONCLUSION

We may now conclude that Hume owes a considerable debt to Locke in his description of personal identity, although he does not admit it in any of his treatises. He tries to establish a theory of personal identity by emphasizing necessary relations (resemblance/analogy and causality), but he denies only the "act of consciousness" in Locke's theory of identity. For Hume thinks that it is upon these relations that we form a mental association by which we declare the soul to be permanent, and upon this belief we associate our personal identity. But Hume makes it clear that this belief is never acceptable because a conception of causal and analogous relations which misleads us into our permanence existence. But we still have to believe in the necessary relationships that our mental processes imagine in order to preserve identity. It can be said, therefore, that Hume offers a more developed theory than Locke's in the analysis of such discourses.

Because Locke's discussion fails to analyse how a person can be known as the same person if he forgets his past events, Hume on the other hand recognizes the necessary relation other than memory by which a person can retain his identity. There is no need to rely entirely on memory. However, Hume identified memory as the only source of inheritance of perception because similarity between perceptions makes an important contribution to the relationship. However, he sought to derive the concepts of necessary relations through memory because only through these concepts could the concept of identity be explained where memory would no longer be needed. So, in conclusion, it can be said that although Hume wanted to conceive of personal identity apart from memory, he could not completely exclude memory because he had to admit memory as an auxiliary factor in the description of personal identity.

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