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Open IMScore Security Enhanced with Private Cloud

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Abstract- The Next Generation Network (NGN) is an IP-based, packet-oriented telecommunications architecture designed to support a wide range of services. The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), in comparison, provides the control layer and service delivery framework that enables multimedia applications to function over NGN. While NGN constitutes the core network infrastructure, IMS serves as the specialized platform responsible for delivering and managing multimedia services such as voice and video communications to end users. Security for users, services, and providers is a fundamental requirement. The growing sophistication of security threats, combined with service diversity and the widespread adoption of cloud-based and distributed systems, has made comprehensive security a primary concern. In this work, a holistic security mechanism is introduced to improve protection across the IMS environment by integrating IMS architecture with cloud computing platforms. This integration leverages the cloud's advanced security capabilities, multiple deldiveeferynseframlayeewros,rkanthdatcoanlltorwols mopeecrhaatnoirssmtso tooffer strengthen system reliability, confidentiality, and overalaldrovabnucsetndeNssG. N services. As shown in Figure 1, the This paper presents an integration between two fields: telecommunication services and network concepts along with open technologies, aiming to provide an open service creation framework and to leverage the security mechanisms offered by cloud-based authentication.

Keywords: IMS, Security, Cloud Computing, OpenStack, SIP.Communication, Low-Latency Processing.

I. INTRODUCTION

Next Generation Networks (NGN) can support a diverse set of services, including interactive multimedia applications such as voice and video communication, conferencing, and instant messaging, as well as non-interactive services like push-based applications, multimedia streaming, and web-based platforms such as e-commerce, e-learning, and e-health services. A major advantage of NGN lies in its ability to unify traditionally separated, vertically structured networks where data, voice, and video services are managed independently into a single, horizontally integrated network infrastructure. The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), standardized by the 3GPP as an open IP-based architecture, uses the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [1] for signaling and enables service convergence across heterogeneous access networks. IMS plays a central role in realizing service convergence by providing a unified serviceIMS architecture follows a horizontal design in which control and service layers are clearly decoupled [6].

Within the IMS framework, service providers can flexibly design their service layers to foster innovation by assembling services from reusable components. IMS supplies standardized service building blocks that can be shared among multiple application servers, facilitating service reuse and significantly shortening service development and deployment cycles [2].

Cloud computing has emerged as a leading paradigm in modern information technology, delivering scalable, flexible, and cost-effective computing resources. Cloud infrastructures provide virtualized resources over the Internet through three primary service models: Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) [3]. These models support a wide range of applications, including multimedia services, Voice over IP (VoIP), and video streaming.

Integrating IMS with cloud computing environments offers substantial benefits by combining IMS's service delivery capabilities with the cloud's flexible resource management and security services. This

integration streamlines the creation of value-added services, supports dynamic allocation of infrastructure and software resources, and enhances security for users, services, and service providers through cloud-based protection mechanisms.

In modern distributed and multi-cloud environments, ensuring secure data transmission remains one of the most pressing challenges, making security requirements paramount. The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) has identified key risks in cloud computing and issued guidelines and best practices addressing threats such as data leakage, malicious insiders, governance loss, and insecure data management.

Likewise, the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) has outlined strategies for constructing robust cloud application security architectures that emphasize visibility, control, and incident remediation while encouraging adherence to security best practices. Additionally, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has proposed several recommendations to help organizations select cloud deployment models that align with their security objectives.

Despite its advantages, securing the IMS environment remains challenging due to the diversity of services, protocols, and architectural components it encompasses. This complexity increases the potential attack surface, exposing IMS users, services, and providers to a broader range of security vulnerabilities and risks.



Figure 1: IMS Architecture

II. IP MULTIMEDIA SUBSYSTEM AND CLOUD COMPUTING

The fast evolution of the Internet has driven major transformations in information technology, influencing both hardware and software systems. The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is intended to operate across heterogeneous networks while enforcing policies that facilitate efficient service delivery to users. In parallel, cloud computing has become a fundamental technology by enabling the storage of massive volumes of data and offering open, multi-infrastructure platforms accessible to users.

IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)

The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) is a core reference framework within Next Generation Networks (NGN), designed to provide a global, open service delivery platform for converged multimedia services. Its objective is to establish a standardized overlay architecture that allows users to access integrated multimedia services regardless of location, access method, or time. IMS achieves this by integrating telecommunications systems, Internet technologies, and real-time multimedia capabilities into a unified and heterogeneous environment.

Consistent with NGN architectural principles, IMS is organized into three functional layers, as shown in Figure 2: the Service Layer, the Control Layer, and the Transport Layer.

- Service Layer (Application Layer): Hosts and executes the services offered to users.
- Control Layer: Manages session control and signaling while regulating traffic between the transport and service layers.
- Transport Layer: Supports the core network by providing connectivity between access networks and IP-based core networks.



Figure 2: The IMS three layers

All telecommunications systems, regardless of their technological maturity, rely on a core set of capabilities such as session management, service control, media processing, and interconnection mechanisms to support essential communication services. In the IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), these functions are distributed among specialized functional entities. The responsibilities and capabilities of these entities are summarized below [4].

Call Session Control Function (CSCF)
The Call Session Control Function (CSCF) forms the central control framework of IMS, providing key functions including user authentication and authorization, session handling, message routing, and service control. A fully deployed IMS network includes three CSCF components operating together: the Serving-CSCF (S-CSCF), the Proxy-CSCF (P-CSCF), and the Interrogating-CSCF (I-CSCF).

Serving-CSCF (S-CSCF)
The Serving-CSCF is the main control entity for user sessions, services, and charging. It interacts with the Home Subscriber Server (HSS) through the Diameter protocol over the Cx interface to obtain authentication credentials and user profiles, which are used to invoke appropriate application servers.

Proxy-CSCF (P-CSCF)
The Proxy-CSCF is positioned at the access edge of the IMS network and acts as the primary entry point to the operator's domain. It is the first element to receive signaling requests from user equipment. When a user accesses the network through a visited domain, the P-CSCF forwards signaling messages to the user's designated S-CSCF in the home network.

Interrogating-CSCF (I-CSCF)
The Interrogating-CSCF is also deployed at the network edge and serves as the initial contact point for signaling messages arriving from external IMS networks. It queries the HSS to determine the appropriate Serving-CSCF and routes messages accordingly. If the HSS does not specify a particular S-CSCF, the I-CSCF selects one.

Application Server (AS)
IMS application servers provide the service logic required to deliver multimedia applications. These servers exist in several forms, including SIP Application Servers (SIP AS), IP Multimedia Service Switching Function Application Servers (IM-SSF AS), and Open Service Access–Service Capability Server Application Servers (OSA-SCS AS).

SIP Application Server (SIP AS)
The SIP Application Server is the most widely used AS type and is responsible for executing service logic for end-user applications based on SIP signaling. It supports a range of next-generation services, such as instant messaging and presence management.

Home Subscriber Server (HSS)
The Home Subscriber Server (HSS) acts as a centralized repository and enhanced Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) entity within the IMS architecture. It stores critical information required for session and service control, including user identities, addressing information, security credentials, location data, user profiles, and service profiles. The HSS also generates security parameters necessary for authentication, integrity verification, and encryption processes.

- **OpenStack private cloud computing**

Cloud computing enables users to access data and applications on demand from any location and at any time. It also offers several advantages, including flexible pricing models, user-friendly web-based interfaces, scalability, and independence from specific end-user devices [3]. Cloud computing services are commonly categorized into three

models: Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS)[5].

Cloud platforms can be either open-source or public. Open-source cloud solutions include platforms such as OpenStack, OpenNebula, Eucalyptus, Heroku, and Cloud9 IDE, while public cloud providers include services like Amazon Web Services (AWS), Microsoft Azure, and Alibaba Cloud. In this project, OpenStack was deployed on CentOS 7. OpenStack is an open-source cloud platform that primarily supports IaaS and PaaS service models and provides a wide range of functionalities within its framework.

The primary objective of the OpenStack platform is to establish a global standard for cloud computing while offering a flexible software framework that supports the ongoing development of cloud solutions for both service providers and end users. OpenStack was initially released in October 2010 under the name Austin and consisted of only two components: Nova and Swift. By October 2025, OpenStack had evolved to its eleventh major release, expanding to include 36 modular components.
OpenStack is composed of several core components, including Horizon for the graphical user interface, Keystone for identity management and user authentication and authorization, Nova for compute services, Cinder and Swift for block and object storage, Glance for image management, Neutron for networking services based on software-defined networking (SDN), Ceilometer for monitoring, and Heat for orchestration, which enables the automated deployment of application stacks composed of multiple resources. All these services are managed and provisioned through standardized APIs with unified authentication mechanisms.



Figure 3: OpenStack components

OpenStack also includes an additional component known as the OpenStack API, which enables developers and programmers to create scripts and applications that automate the deployment and management of hardware resources through system administration and software configuration. By leveraging the OpenStack API, it is possible to automate tasks such as container deployment, service application management, web server stack configuration, elastic cloud orchestration, database operations, network traffic optimization, and platform security enforcement.
Figure 4 illustrates the OpenStack dashboard interface.

Figure 4: m OpenStack dashboard

OpenStack is exposed to security risks originating not only from external attackers but also from internal sources, including co-tenants and even the service provider itself. Security assessments were conducted on the server node, virtual machine instances running both Windows and Linux operating systems, and the Horizon web-based dashboard interface.

In this deployment, OpenStack was installed on a single host running CentOS 7.

Table 1: Openstack Component

Component	Code Name	Description
Compute	Nova & e	Instances (KVM)
Image Service	Glance	Disk(Server)
Object Storage	Swift	Scalable
Identity	Keystone	Authentication
Networking	Neutron	IP Network

III. INTEGRATION BETWEEN IMS AND CLOUD COMPUTING

The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) introduces a wide range of new services and applications for users, which has significantly increased industry interest in this technology. However, the traditional IMS infrastructure faces several challenges due to the growing demand for IMS services. Conventional IMS relies on a set of SIP servers, such as CSCF entities, each performing a specific function. Additionally, the scalability of front-end distributors, which depends on expensive, specialized hardware, heavily influences SIP scalability. Consequently, traditional IMS systems often underperform compared to IT environments that leverage cloud computing, which offers exceptional scalability and availability.

Cloud computing allows for rapid and efficient deployment of new applications by pooling hardware and software resources. It also provides powerful computing capabilities and virtually unlimited storage. However, despite technical advances, different cloud providers have yet to fully meet consumer expectations. Several factors limit broader adoption:

- Lack of comprehensive signaling control: Most cloud platforms rely on web interfaces, which cannot fully support advanced mechanisms such as granular service access control and flexible pricing models. This limitation makes it difficult for telecom providers to offer profitable public cloud services.
- Quality of Service (QoS) concerns: Cloud services, being primarily Internet-based, cannot consistently guarantee QoS. Regardless of service type, cloud systems place significant demands on network bandwidth.
- Fragmented user experience: Users face platform-specific requirements and cannot easily switch between cloud providers, leading to a disjointed experience.



Figure 5: Integration between IMS and cloud

To address these challenges, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) introduced IMS [1], which has become the primary signaling architecture for Next Generation Networks (NGN) and is widely adopted by telecom operators globally. IMS's key advantage is its ability to provide standardized signaling control and configurable QoS for IP services[2].

Despite this, IMS adoption remains limited due to the lack of innovative services. Therefore, integrating cloud computing into IMS is critical. In this architecture, cloud services act as fundamental IMS applications, while IMS provides an open, standardized service platform [9]. The combination of IMS and cloud computing enhances the capabilities of both technologies. User devices require capabilities such as internet access, audio/video decoding, and interactive processing via cloud-based execution, enabling rapid growth of IMS value-added services through cloud technologies.

IMS's open and standardized signaling control allows implementation of advanced service access controls, including digital rights management, charging, and security. IMS can also manage IP multimedia sessions with negotiated QoS not only at session setup but throughout the session, interacting with network components that carry application flows. Additionally, IMS can tailor

features based on user profiles, locations, access networks, and devices.

Through standardized interfaces, existing IMS services such as presence, group management, authentication, and capability negotiation can be extended to cloud services. Cloud platforms can also leverage basic IMS services, and uniform cloud interfaces based on IMS design promote standardization across cloud computing services.

The functional architecture of cloud computing integrated with IMS is shown in Figure 5. This architecture updates IMS specifications to meet the demands of cloud services. Cloud service functions and cloud interaction functions are the two main functional categories. The IMS core handles all SIP signaling for cloud session management and service notifications, while data flows between the user equipment (UE) and the cloud platform bypass the IMS core. This architecture supports multi-provider environments.

The UE interacts with the cloud platform using multiple interfaces: the Gm interface via the IMS core for session management and service awareness, the Ut interface for managing user profiles, and the Xd interface to access cloud services. These interfaces are compatible with 3GPP IMS specifications.

User data for cloud services is divided into IMS profiles and cloud-specific profiles. IMS profiles contain information required to establish sessions and access services via application servers, while cloud-specific profiles store information needed to operate cloud services, such as enrolled service lists. IMS profile information is stored in the Home Subscriber Server (HSS), whereas cloud-specific profiles may be kept in dedicated databases, application servers, or the HSS. In systems with multiple HSS instances, the Subscription Locator Function (SLF) helps the IMS core and cloud service functions locate the correct HSS at Dh and Dx reference points, respectively.

IV. SECURE SERVICE, USERS AND PROVIDERS

Cloud computing-OpenStack security

According to the CSA Security Guidance for Critical Areas of Focus in Cloud Computing published by the Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), the primary security controls for OpenStack focus on data protection, regulatory compliance, and operational efficiency [7]:

- Access Management: Enforce Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA).
- Data Encryption: Secure data at rest and during transmission using OpenStack tools like Cinder.
- Network Security: Implement network segmentation and configure firewalls to minimize vulnerabilities.
- Monitoring and Logging: Centralize logs and enable real-time threat detection.
- Compliance and Governance: Ensure adherence to regulations such as GDPR, HIPAA, and PCI DSS.
- Incident Response: Prepare response plans and regularly test disaster recovery processes.
- Configuration Hardening: Strengthen security of OpenStack components, including Nova, Keystone, and Neutron.
- Third-Party Integration Security: Assess external tools and protect APIs.

RBAC organizes user permissions based on roles rather than assigning them individually, simplifying access management and enhancing security in OpenStack environments through policy.json configuration files. When combined with MFA, RBAC provides a strong framework for secure access control.

Data encryption adds another critical layer of security in OpenStack, working alongside strict access controls to protect information both at rest (stored data) and in transit (data being transferred). OpenStack supports encryption for both scenarios

through its various services, ensuring comprehensive protection of sensitive information.

Table 2: Openstack Services

Encryptions Service	OpenStack Service	Security Level
Data at Rest	Cinder	AES-256
Data at Rest	Nova	Sever-Enc
Data in transit	All Service	TLS

Network security serves as the primary defense against unauthorized access and potential breaches in private cloud environments. In OpenStack, it is a critical concern, often regarded as a top priority by cloud security professionals. Network segmentation helps create isolated zones to contain security incidents and safeguard sensitive workloads. OpenStack's Neutron networking component provides organizations with fine-grained control over their cloud infrastructure. Additionally, firewalls and security groups allow instance-level traffic management, which scales efficiently as the cloud environment expands. These tools complement network segmentation by enforcing rules directly on individual instances.

OpenStack also supports compliance with various industry-specific and data-centric regulations, such as GDPR, HIPAA, and SOX [11]. Its built-in tools streamline compliance through automated policy enforcement, making it easier to meet regulatory requirements. These tools also integrate with audit logging and monitoring systems, ensuring continuous oversight and accountability.

IMS Security

In the IMS core, securing services does not replace network security but rather focuses on protecting the data transmitted through the network and the services offered by the IMS framework[10]. This data includes information necessary for both users and services. To ensure service data security, the following measures are essential:

- The data privacy service provides protection from unauthorized disclosure of information.
- Service data integrity: provides the means to prove data integrity and detects data modifications, deletion and re-direction.
- Service authentication: there are three different kinds of service authentication:
- Entity service authentication: confirm partner identities during connection establishment. This service detects, simulates or replaces the identity of the equipment.

- Human user service authentication: same idea as above for human users.
- Data origin authentication: provides confidence in the identity of the information source.
- No-repudiation with proof of origin delivery: with this service, the recipient of a message can prove that data is sent by a specific author, and vice versa. The sender of the message can prove that the recipient received a specific message from him.
- Access to the control service: this service protects resources of this unauthorized user network (eg, reading or writing of unauthorized information, unauthorized use of services, unauthorized use of processing capacity of storage, etc.)
- Service anonymity: this service protects users against any tracking operation by any operator or user staff. As an example, it should be impossible to say where a user is currently located or what service is, he using on the network; In this context, it is inevitable, that some form of location or identity information must pass through the network to accuse purposes or to secure and establish a connection.
- Check services: these services provide functions to detect and investigate security attacks.

Securing IMS services with OpenStack cloud

In the network architecture integrating IMS and cloud computing, IMS offers significant benefits to cloud computing, while the cloud provides multiple services to enhance IMS functionality. For our IMS–cloud integration, we utilize the open-source OpenStack platform (www.openstack.org) alongside

imsOpenCore, developed by Fraunhofer FOKUS[10], as shown in Figure 8.

OpenStack includes a central authentication and authorization component called Keystone, which handles authentication not only for users but also for OpenStack services. Keystone provides identity management, token issuance, service catalog, and policy services compatible with API versions 2 and 3. When a functional request is received, Keystone verifies the user's credentials (such as username, password, and URL) to confirm authorization [8].

Once verified, a token is issued containing the user's projects and associated roles.

Users can then use this token for subsequent requests without re-authenticating each time. The token's expiration and validity period are configurable, as illustrated in Figure 6.



Figure 6: Keystone architecture and process with cloud components module

As shown in the integration diagram in Figure 5, we set up six virtual machines (VM1 to VM6) and three containers. Each virtual machine hosts a specific software service or database (in the case of containers), dedicated to individual users[9]. External users can access these machines through a public IP address, but only after authentication and authorization are performed by Keystone services, as illustrated in Figure 7.



Figure 7: Openstack virtual machine topology

The IMS infrastructure is realized by the open source, Open IMS Core proposed by The Open IMS Core Project from FOKUS.

On the First we will Create and send a REST API request to interact with an OpenStack service (for example, the Compute service, Nova).

Step 1 : Create a instance (VM-Server) via Nova POST: http://172.24.4.10/v2.1/server1
X-Auth-Token: X-Auth-Token Content-Type: application/json "server": VM1
"imageRef":"a6f90712-4de7-4c3c-8df4-20d7f9aab4f" "flavorRef": 1
"networks": "private": "1b8b7d18-7b5f-4a94-8b47-6dfc9e2cbabc"

Step 2 : Authenticate and get a token for IMS service with Keystone OpenStack uses Keystone for identity and authentication, we must first send a POST request to the Keystone API to obtain an authentication token
POST: http://172.24.4.11:5000/v3/auth/tokens
Content-Type: application/json
"Auth":
"identity":
Methods": passwordes

Step 3 : Use the token to call OpenStack service.
For example, to list all servers (instances) in Nova
GET: http://172.24.4.15 8774/v2.1/servers/detail
X-Auth-Token: ¡TOKEN. Content-Type: application/json

Step 4 :Registration from an IMS user service
REGISTER: sips:test.example.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/TLS client.test.example.com:5061 From: Bob ¡sips:bob@test.example.com¿;tag= To: eve ¡sips:eve@test.example.com¿

Call-ID: 12345@test.example.com CSeq: 1 REGISTER Authorization: Digest username="test", realm="test.example.com", uri= sips:ss2.test.example.com Server: 172.24.4.1



Figure 9 : Client registrar

Another security feature provided by OpenStack is the Security Group. A security group (figure 10) acts as a container for a set of security rules, enabling administrators and projects to define the types of traffic and their direction (ingress or egress) that are permitted through a virtual interface port. Whenever a virtual interface port is created in OpenStack Networking, it is automatically associated with a

security group. Therefore, when using OpenStack Networking, the nova.conf configuration should disable the built-in security groups and route all security group operations through the OpenStack Networking API.

Figure 10 : IMS security Group In OpenStack

Integrated into the IMS service and data is related to the Openstack API configured in the security group proposed by Openstack.Figure 11



Figure 11: Traffic between IMS and Cloud

V. CONCLUSION

This paper presents a platform for integrating IMS with cloud computing using open standards. Various vendors and developers can deliver different cloud services, which are treated as standard IMS applications. IMS terminals require only minimal modifications to access these cloud services. The SIP/Diameter protocol is used to establish and manage communication between clients and cloud platforms. Once an IMS function is active, it is crucial to ensure the security of both users and services within the IMS framework.

By adopting cloud-based security mechanisms, IMS can enhance its overall security, fostering greater confidence and investment in IMS services within the industry. These security measures help users trust that their data is protected, facilitating the transition to cloud platforms and the growth of cloud service ecosystems.

Further research is necessary to tackle challenges such as scaling IMS architecture across multiple technologies and ensuring compatibility with different cloud computing providers.

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