International Journal of Science, Engineering and TechnologyAuthors: B. Venakata Ramana, L Tejashwini
Abstract: This paper presents a rigorous mathematical framework for analyzing contemporary political dynamics, focusing on the coupled phenomena of voter radicalization, partisan polarization, and institutional stability under feedback. While existing models rely on restrictive assumptions such as static voter preferences or one-dimensional ideological spaces, we introduce a synthetically generated but physically consistent dataset that satisfies conservation of electorate mass, thermodynamic consistency conditions, and equilibrium stability criteria across seven Western democracies (United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Italy, and India) from 1990 to 2025. Using a compartmental differential equation framework with game-theoretic hazard modeling, we demonstrate that electoral systems exhibiting large-party seat bias correlate with polarization indices up to 0.47 higher than proportional systems. Furthermore, we show that a critical campaign spending threshold of approximately $1.8 million (2020 USD) triggers a polarization phase transition analogous to the random field Ising model, validated against historical U.S. House election data from 1980–2020. The model predicts that eliminating the electoral reset option—as proposed in India’s One Nation, One Election reform—would reduce government collapses by 71% while concentrating instability in the first year of tenure. This work provides a benchmark-ready analytical toolkit for institutional design and polarization mitigation.
DOI: http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20583789
